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Making Waves in a Sea of Uncertainty: Howerton Muddies the
Waters of Expert Testimony Admissibility Standards in North
Carolina
In Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd.,1 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina expressly rejected the Daubert standard' for the
admissibility of expert testimony, stating that "North Carolina is not,
nor has it ever been, a Daubert jurisdiction."3  Instead, the court
adopted a purportedly more flexible test based upon the reliability
and relevance of the evidence as well as the expert's qualifications.4
This Recent Development argues that the Howerton decision is a step
backward in the development of North Carolina evidence law. In
addition to departing from precedent and policy and unnecessarily
burdening the trier of fact, the decision removes the clarity from a
workable admissibility test, rendering uncertain the standards for
admitting expert testimony in North Carolina.
This Recent Development begins by briefly discussing the
holdings in the Daubert and Howerton decisions. Next, this Recent
Development discusses the inherent flaws in claiming to reject
Daubert by discussing the Howerton court's departure from both
North Carolina precedent that adheres to Daubert-like principles and
well-established policies behind the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence. Then, this Recent Development discusses additional
implications that are likely to result from the decision, notably an
undue burden on the trier of fact and decreased judicial efficiency.
Finally, this Recent Development asserts that by rejecting Daubert,
the Howerton decision not only removes a clear framework for
admitting expert testimony, but also fails to assert a new one,
providing lower courts with only an unclear and apparently overly
permissive standard, leaving the future of expert testimony in North
Carolina uncertain at best.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., provided a new standard for
evaluating proffered expert testimony under Federal Rule of
1. 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2004).
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-97 (1993) (codified at
FED. R. EVID. 702) (amended Dec. 1, 2000); see infra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.
3. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 469, 597 S.E.2d at 693.
4. See id. at 458-69, 597 S.E.2d at 686-93.
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Evidence 702.1 In Daubert, the plaintiffs sued a pharmaceutical
company, claiming that their birth defects were caused by their
mothers' ingestion of a prescription anti-nausea drug manufactured
and sold by the defendant.6 The district court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff sought to prove
causation by introducing expert testimony that was not based upon
generally accepted scientific principles.7 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed,8 citing Frye v. United States.9 Reversing
the Ninth Circuit and rejecting the previously controlling Frye
"general acceptance" test, ° the Supreme Court held that complying
with Rule 702 instead requires an analysis based on the reliability and
relevance of scientific evidence." The analysis "entails a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."' 2 Daubert
also provided a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to consider in
making the reliability assessment, including whether the theory or
technique can be or has been tested, whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review and publication, what the known or
potential rate of error for the technique is, and whether the theory or
technique has gained general acceptance within the scientific
community. 3 Thus, by requiring examination of the methodology
behind an evidentiary submission, Daubert entrusted federal judges
with a gatekeeper role, charging them to let in only reliable and
relevant evidence, consistent with the requirements of Rule 702.14
5. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-97; FED. R. EVID. 702.
6. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
7. See id. at 583.
8. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
10. See id. (holding that to be admissible, expert testimony must be deduced from a
principle or discovery "established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs").
11. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-91; cf Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149
(1999) (extending "Daubert's general principles ... to the expert matters described in
Rule 702").
12. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
13. See id. at 593-94.
14. See id. at 597.
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Although Daubert has been criticized for its rigidity" and for
giving judges too difficult a task, 16 the case has also been widely cited
and treated as valid precedent for over a decade.17 Rule 702 of the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence'--modeled after the
corresponding federal rule before its amendment'g-governs the
admissibility of expert testimony in North Carolina courts.
Nevertheless, North Carolina had adopted principles very similar to
those in Daubert-well before the federal standard emerged-and
seemed to embrace those principles until the Howerton decision.z
In Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., the plaintiff, Bruce Howerton,
who suffered permanent injuries as a result of a motorcycle accident,
sued the manufacturer of his motorcycle helmet, alleging
manufacturing and design defects that proximately caused his injuries
and breach of express and implied warranties. 2' Howerton sought to
15. See, e.g., Frank M. McClellan, Bendectin Revisited: Is There a Right to a Jury Trial
in an Age of Judicial Gatekeeping?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 261, 279 (1998) (asserting that the
judicial gatekeeping role usurps the function of a jury of citizens to engage in the
resolution of disputes).
16. See, e.g., Shirley A. Dobbin et al., Applying Daubert: How Well Do Judges
Understand Science and Scientific Method?, 85 JUDICATURE 244, 247 (2002) (explaining
that trial judges may not possess the understanding necessary to assess the reliability and
relevance of scientific evidence in order to make an educated decision about whether it
has been obtained in a scientifically valid way and, therefore, is admissible in trial).
17. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 (1999) (extending
Daubert's holding to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997) (holding that an abuse of discretion is the proper standard
for examining admissibility decisions under Daubert); State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 527,
461 S.E.2d 631, 639-40 (1995) (citing the central holding in Daubert); Taylor v. Abernethy,
149 N.C. App. 263, 272-74, 560 S.E.2d 233, 239-40 (2002) (citing Daubert and
acknowledging it as important precedent); see also Amy T. Schutz, Note, The New
Gatekeepers: Judging Scientific Evidence in a Post-Frye World, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1060, 1084
(1994) (maintaining that "Daubert provides the new gatekeepers with a more accurate,
effective and appropriate guide to determining the admissibility of scientific evidence").
In fact, Daubert has been followed and expanded upon by other Supreme Court cases,
extending Daubert's reach to non-scientific testimony.
18. N.C. R. EVID. 702(a) ("If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion.").
19. Kenneth S. Broun, Daubert is Alive and Well in North Carolina-In Fact, We Beat
the Feds to the Punch, N.C. ST. B.J., Fall 2002, at 10, 11. The original text of Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 reads as follows: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at FED. R. EvID. 702).
20. Id. at 12; see infra notes 54-58, 60-70 and accompanying text.
21. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 442-43, 597 S.E.2d 674, 677-78
(2004).
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admit the scientific testimony of various experts to prove the
existence of the alleged defects and, just as in Daubert, their causal
link to the plaintiff's injuries.22 Based on both the Daubert test,
particularly its reliability factors, and North Carolina precedent,
which the court held to be consistent with Daubert, the trial court
excluded all of Howerton's causation experts as unreliable. 23 Left
with no admissible evidence of causation, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant,24 and the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina affirmed.25 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina reversed, expressly rejecting the Daubert standard26 and
instead adopting a "decidedly less mechanistic and rigorous"
approach to the admissibility of expert testimony.27 The court's
approach emphasized a three-step test for evaluating the admissibility
of proffered expert testimony: "(1) Is the expert's proffered method
of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is
the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of
testimony? [and] (3) Is the expert's testimony relevant? '28  The
Howerton test is a "preliminary, foundational inquiry" into the
reliability of expert testimony,29 and, contrary to Daubert, it does not
require judges to look as deeply into the methodology used by the
expert in reaching his conclusions.
22. See id. at 444-52, 597 S.E.2d at 678-82 (detailing the testimony proffered,
including that of experts in motorcycle accidents and motorcycle helmets, biomechanics
and orthopedic biomechanics, the design and manufacture of composite materials, and
neurosurgery).
23. See id. at 452-53, 597 S.E.2d at 683 (noting the following about the expert
testimony in the case: none of the experts conducted testing or research relevant to
establishing causation; none were peer-reviewed or published on these issues; none
showed that their opinions were generally accepted within the field; the data relied upon
had a high rate of error; and many of the experts' opinions were contrary to the existing
state of research in their particular fields).
24. Id. at 453, 597 S.E.2d at 683.
25. Id. at 454, 597 S.E.2d at 684; Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 158 N.C. App. 316,
581 S.E.2d 816 (2003), rev'd, 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2004).
26. Although it purports to follow State v. Goode, Howerton expressly rejects the
Daubert standard. Howerton, 358 N.C. 440, 469, 587 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004) ("We
therefore expressly reject the federal Daubert standard .... North Carolina is not, nor has
it ever been, a Daubert jurisdiction."). Furthermore, the Howerton court notes that,
"[w]hile [Goode, Bullard, Temple, and Crowder] share obvious similarities with the
principles underlying Daubert, application of the North Carolina approach is decidedly
less mechanistic and rigorous than the.., federal approach." Id. at 464, 597 S.E.2d at 690.
27. Id. at 464, 597 S.E.2d at 690. The Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded the
case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. It remains to be determined whether
plaintiff's expert testimony will be admitted under the new, ultra-flexible standard.
28. Id. at 458, 597 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 528-29, 461
S.E.2d 631, 640-41 (1995) (citations omitted)).
29. Id. at 460, 597 S.E.2d at 687.
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Because states are free to craft their own rules governing
evidentiary admissions, Daubert is not binding on state courts.30
Several states that have adopted rules similar to the Federal Rules of
Evidence have rejected the Daubert standard,31 while others have
expressly adopted it.32 While states can legally depart from Daubert,
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, following precedent prior to
Daubert, has many times embraced both the reliability standard and
the gatekeeper function that the United States Supreme Court set
forth in Daubert, demonstrating that North Carolina has apparently
not rejected Daubert but has instead made use of its central holding
for decades.33 The commentary to Rule 102 of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence makes it clear that when "[p]roblems of
construction ... arise ... our courts should examine North Carolina
cases as well as federal cases for enlightenment."'  Instead of
following the clear path of precedent as suggested by the North
Carolina Rules, the Supreme Court of North Carolina deviated from
a test that has guided decisions regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony in this state for nearly twenty years.
The Howerton court gave modest guidance on how to navigate
the "test," but what little it provided emphasizes some of Howerton's
key differences from Daubert, notably in the areas of reliability
determination, expert qualifications, and relevance. First, when
North Carolina courts evaluate whether an "expert's proffered
method of proof [is] sufficiently reliable[,]" 35 they are urged to
determine the reliability of the general area of testimony by seeking
guidance from the case law, or when faced with novel theories,
looking for the presence of various indices of reliability.36 This
reliability standard is quite different from the one set forth in
30. See Stan Kitzinger, Note, The Supreme Court Waves Good-bye to Frye: Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 58 ALB. L. REV. 575,604-05 (1994).
31. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 922 P.2d 294 (Ariz. 1996); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d
827 (Fla. 1993); State v. Traylor, 656 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2003); Krause, Inc. v. Little, 34
P.3d 566 (Nev. 2001); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994); Grady v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 839 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 2003); State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. 1999); State v. Jones,
922 P.2d 806 (Wash. 1996).
32. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512 (Ark. 2000);
State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993); Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d
31 (Miss. 2003); State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482 (S.D. 1994); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d
196 (W. Va. 1993).
33. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
34. N.C. R. EvID. 102 cmt.
35. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 458, 597 S.E.2d 674, 695 (2004)
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 529, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639
(1995)).
36. Id. at 459-60, 597 S.E.2d at 687.
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Daubert. Under the federal standard, courts are urged to look to the
methodology underlying the testimony itself,37 rather than to the
reliability of the general area under which the testimony falls. The
federal standard ensures that the reliability determination will focus
on the actual testimony involved in each particular case. Howerton's
indices of reliability, applied where precedent provides no guidance,
also differ from those in Daubert. These indices include "the expert's
use of established techniques, the expert's professional background in
the field, the use of visual aids before the jury ... and independent
research conducted by the expert."38 These indices probe less deeply
into scientific methodology than Daubert, indicating the court's desire
to have any "questions or controversy" regarding reliability beyond a
preliminary analysis "go to the weight of the testimony rather than its
admissibility. ,39
On its face, the second part of the Howerton test, determining
whether "the witness testifying at trial [is] qualified as an expert in
that area of testimony, '40 does not appear to differ significantly from
anything that is required in Daubert.41 After all, under both Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 and North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702, a
witness can qualify as an expert because of "knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education" when that serves as a basis for the
testimony.42 The Howerton court, however, liberally construed the
applicable part of Rule 702, noting that "[i]t is not necessary that an
expert be experienced with the identical subject matter at issue or...
even engaged in a specific profession. '43 The expert will be qualified
as long as the court can find that "because of his expertise [the
expert] is in a better position to have an opinion on the subject than is
the trier of fact."44 In addition, the Howerton court found no real
difference between a proffered expert's formal academic credentials
37. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (codified
at FED. R. EVID. 702) (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
38. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 460, 597 S.E.2d at 687 (quoting State v. Pennington, 327
N.C. 89, 98, 393 S.E.2d 847, 853 (1990)).
39. Id. at 461, 597 S.E.2d at 688.
40. Id. at 458, 597 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting Goode, 341 N.C. at 529, 461 S.E.2d at 640).
41. See id. at 461-62, 597 S.E.2d at 688. Although not spelled out expressly in
Daubert, implicit in the decision is the idea that an expert proffering testimony would
qualify as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 702) (noting that "if scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue an expert 'may testify thereto' ").
42. FED. R. EVID. 702; N.C. R. EvID. 702(a).
43. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 461, 597 S.E.2d at 688 (quoting State v. Goode, 341 N.C.
513, 529, 461 S.E.2d 631, 640 (1995)).
44. Id.
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and those obtained via practical experience. 45 Thus, the Howerton
court's qualification requirement appears more flexible than what is
implicitly required under Daubert.
Finally, in examining the relevance of an expert's testimony, the
Howerton court held that "[tjhe trial court must always be satisfied
that the expert's testimony is relevant," but provided only the
traditional definition of relevant evidence in the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence for guidance in making this determination.
46
Daubert focuses not only on the general definition of relevance but
also on the applicability of the expert's methodology or reasoning to
the particular facts of the case.47 The Daubert Court found that this
determination of "fit[ness]" is necessary because "scientific validity
for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other,
unrelated purposes. '48  In addition, the Daubert Court notes that
Rule 702 requires that evidence "assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," giving further
guidance.49 Thus, Howerton's examination of relevant testimony is
more general, while the analysis in Daubert is highly fact-specific.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina attempted to justify its
adoption of a more flexible test than the federal standard by
expressing its concerns with the inherent difficulties in determining
legal reliability in an ever-changing and complex scientific world. 0
The Howerton court did not want to impose those difficulties upon
judges at the risk of increasing the expenditure of human resources.5'
The court reasoned that because of the stringent application of
Daubert-like principles, parties could cleverly use pre-trial motions to
exclude testimony as a way to prevail on otherwise out-of-reach
motions for summary judgment.52 Quoting a federal district court, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina further expressed concern that a
party might be "unable to present an essential element of his or her
claim, or to proffer a defense ... if Daubert [was applied] heavy-
handedly" and the party's expert witnesses were barred from
45. See id. at 462, 597 S.E.2d at 688.
46. Id. See generally N.C. R. EVID. 401 (" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
47. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (codified at
FED. R. EVID. 702) (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
48. Id. at 591.
49. Id. (quoting Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as
amended at FED. R. EVID. 702)).
50. See Howerton, 358 N.C. at 464-65, 597 S.E.2d at 690.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 467, 597 S.E.2d at 691-92.
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testifying. 3 Although these concerns are valid, the remedy provided
by the Howerton decision departs significantly from precedent and
valid policy considerations and is more vague and unworkable than
the framework set forth in Daubert. A consideration of each of these
problems will reveal the significant deficiencies inherent in the
Howerton decision.
The decision to reject the Daubert standard departs from
significant North Carolina precedent. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina anticipated the Daubert holding by nine years in adopting an
approach based upon principles remarkably similar to those
expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert14 In State
v. Bullard,5 the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered the
admissibility of a physical anthropologist's testimony as an expert in
identifying a "bloody bare footprint."56 In holding that the expert's
opinion was correctly admitted, the court, as in Daubert, emphasized
that reliability and relevance are the key factors in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony." The "common thread[s]" between
Daubert and Bullard are the emphasis on reliability and the role of
the trial judge as gatekeeper in determining reliability58 rather than
the previously used general acceptance test.59 The Supreme Court of
North Carolina likewise emphasized the importance of the reliability
of the scientific method in its decision to admit DNA analysis
evidence in State v. Pennington,6" another pre-Daubert case. In
Pennington, the court articulated indices of reliability similar to those
53. Id. (quoting Brasher v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 n.12
(N.D. Ala. 2001)).
54. Broun, supra note 19, at 10 (citing State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 370
(1984)); id. at 12 (noting that in State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 98, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852-
53 (1990), the Supreme Court of North Carolina "used factors similar to those in Bullard
to assess the trial court's determination of reliability"); id. at 14 ("In Taylor [v. Abernethy],
149 N.C. App. 263, 560 S.E.2d 233 (2002), the [c]ourt reaffirmed its adherence to the
principles of both the Daubert and Bullard cases and set some reasonably clear parameters
for their application.").
55. 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 370 (1984).
56. Id. at 132, 322 S.E.2d at 372.
57. See id. at 147-54, 322 S.E.2d at 380-85.
58. Broun, supra note 19, at 12; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 590-93, 597 (1993) (noting that compliance with Federal Rule of Evidence 702
requires admitting only reliable and relevant evidence and that judges are responsible for
making the determination of reliability and relevance and admitting only evidence that
meets these standards); Bullard, 312 N.C. at 148, 322 S.E.2d at 381 ("In general when no
specific precedent exists, scientifically accepted reliability justifies admission of the
testimony of qualified witnesses, and such reliability may be found either by judicial notice
or from the testimony of... expert[s] .... ).
59. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
60. 327 N.C. 89, 98-100, 393 S.E.2d 847,852-54 (1990).
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set forth in Bullard.6 1 The Pennington court also noted that although
admissible in this case, DNA evidence may not be admissible in every
case, depending on an analysis of the reliability of the methods used
and the evidence's applicability to the facts of the particular case.62
The Pennington court's approach was "entirely consistent with ...
Daubert and other federal cases. '63  Pennington emphasized the
methodology and applicability of methods used to the particular facts
of the case, resounding with Daubert and differing significantly from
the reliability test set forth in Howerton.
Since the United States Supreme Court's holding in Daubert,
both the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina have acknowledged Daubert and applied it in
numerous opinions.' In State v. Goode, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina appeared to expressly recognize Daubert as stating the
proper test for the admissibility of expert testimony.65 In Goode, a
convicted defendant challenged the admissibility of expert testimony
in the field of bloodstain pattern interpretation.66 The court cited the
central holding of Daubert: compliance with Rule 702 "requires a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is sufficiently valid and whether the
reasoning or methodology can be properly applied to the facts in
issue. 67 Although the Goode court discussed indicia of reliability
that differed from the Daubert factors,68 the court nevertheless
embraced Daubert's central requirement of reliability69  in
determining that the trial court had properly admitted the evidence.70
Despite the Howerton court's position that it never adopted the
61. Id. at 98, 393 S.E.2d at 852-53 ("[W]e have focused on the following indices of
reliability: the expert's use of established techniques, the expert's professional
background in the field, the use of visual aids before the jury ... and independent research
conducted by the expert." (internal citations omitted)).
62. See id. at 101, 393 S.E.2d at 854.
63. Broun, supra note 19, at 14.
64. See supra note 54.
65. 341 N.C. 513,461 S.E.2d 631 (1995).
66. See id. at 529-30, 461 S.E.2d at 641.
67. Id. at 527, 461 S.E.2d at 639 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993)).
68. See id. at 527-28, 461 S.E.2d at 639-40; cf Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993) (listing nonexclusive factors for determining reliability of
scientific theories and techniques including "testability," extent of peer review and
publication, rate of error, and general acceptance (internal citations omitted)).
69. See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 n.12 (noting that "[a] number of
authorities have presented variations on the reliability approach, each with its own slightly
different set of factors").
70. See Goode, 341 N.C. at 534-35,461 S.E.2d at 643-44.
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Daubert standard and that case law only "referenced [Daubert] ... to
underscore the generally acknowledged importance of ...
reliability,"'" the Goode court's acceptance of Daubert's holding is a
clear indication otherwise. Furthermore, in Howerton, the court
conceded that Goode "and other North Carolina cases share obvious
similarities with the principles underlying Daubert,"72 making the
Howerton court's outright rejection of Daubert both surprising and
confusing.
Since Goode, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina has
recognized Daubert as the applicable standard in fourteen cases,
which it cited in support of doing so again in Howerton.73 In State v.
Underwood,74 the court embraced Daubert by adopting indices of
reliability similar to the Daubert factors and applying those factors
along with North Carolina precedent to admit mitochondrial DNA
evidence presented by a qualified expert.7" In State v. MacCardwell,76
the court considered factors from both Pennington and Daubert to
conclude that a chemical test used to determine the defendant's blood
alcohol content was reliable and, thus, admissible.77 In State v.
Stokes,78 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina cited both Daubert
and Goode in recognizing that "the trial court has the duty to act as
gatekeeper and to insure that expert opinion is properly founded on
scientifically reliable methodology."79  Most recently, in Taylor v.
Abernethy, 0 the court of appeals cited Daubert, noting that "in its
role as gatekeeper, the pertinent question for the trial court is ...
whether the testimony is sufficiently reliable."81 In line with Daubert,
Bullard, and Goode, the Taylor court held that the reliability question
requires a preliminary assessment of the evidence's validity and
application to the facts of the case.82 In holding that evidence of
handwriting analysis in a contract dispute was reliable and should
71. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440,463,597 S.E.2d 674, 689 (2004).
72. Id. at 464, 597 S.E.2d at 690.
73. See Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 158 N.C. App. 316, 331-32, 581 S.E.2d 816,
826 (2003), rev'd, 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2004).
74. 134 N.C. App. 533, 518 S.E.2d 231 (1999).
75. Id. at 542-44, 518 S.E.2d at 239-40.
76. 133 N.C. App. 496, 516 S.E.2d 388 (1999).
77. See id. at 505-06, 516 S.E.2d at 394-95.
78. 150 N.C. App. 211, 565 S.E.2d 196 (2002), rev'd on other grounds, 357 N.C. 220,
581 S.E.2d 51 (2003).
79. Id. at 225-26, 565 S.E.2d at 206 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) and State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 527, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639 (1995)).
80. 149 N.C. App. 263,560 S.E.2d 233 (2002).
81. Id. at 272-73, 560 S.E.2d at 239.
82. See id. at 272-74, 560 S.E.2d at 239-40.
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have been admitted,83 Taylor is particularly significant as a recent civil
case upholding the principles set forth in Daubert and its progeny. 84
Not only does Howerton depart from applicable precedent, but it
also departs from important policy considerations regarding expert
testimony. Such considerations include: following the purpose
inherent in the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, keeping matters of
law distinct from questions of fact to be decided by the jury, and
maintaining judicial efficiency. This Recent Development
demonstrates that by failing to address these essential goals of the
adversary system, Howerton negatively impacts practitioners by
creating uncertainties in areas that were once clearly defined.
The Howerton decision significantly negates a stated advantage
of the design of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. The General
Assembly intended the North Carolina Rules of Evidence to be read
in a way that makes use of the large body of law surrounding the
Federal Rules of Evidence." The commentary to Rule 102 of the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides that:
The intent [in indicating whether each rule is identical to its
federal counterpart] is to make applicable, as an aid in
construction, the federal decisional law construing identical or
similar provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence .... A
substantial body of law construing these rules exists and should
be looked to by the courts for enlightenment and guidance in
ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly in adopting
these rules.86
Further commentary to Rule 102 declares that "[u]niformity of
evidence rulings in the courts of this State and federal courts is one
motivating factor in adopting these rules and should be a goal of our
courts in construing those rules that are identical." 87 Therefore, by
drafting rules similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the General
Assembly indicated its desire to employ federal decisions in
construing the North Carolina rules.
83. See id. at 273-75, 560 S.E.2d at 239-40.
84. Taylor is significant because it, like Howerton, is a civil case, while much of the
other North Carolina precedent relates to the admissibility of expert testimony in criminal
cases.
85. See Laura E. Crumpler & Gordon Widenhouse, An Analysis of the New North
Carolina Evidence Code: Opportunity for Reform, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1984).
86. N.C. R. EVID. 102 cmt.
87. Id.
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Additional support for this idea can be found in North Carolina
case law. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina noted that "[t]he
North Carolina Rules of Evidence mirror almost completely the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, decisions construing the Federal
Rules of Evidence are often helpful."88  Because the federal rule
regarding expert testimony was fully interpreted in Daubert and
subsequent cases,89 the policy behind the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence militates toward directing North Carolina courts to follow
the federal position. Such a clear statement by the legislature with
support from the court of appeals indicates that the North Carolina
General Assembly adopted rules that model the Federal Rules of
Evidence to provide North Carolina courts with increased certainty
through an established body of case law. Therefore, by expressly
rejecting the Daubert standard, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
deviated from legislative design without adequate justification.
Those defending the Howerton decision may argue that while
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to codify the holding in
Daubert, the North Carolina rule remains unchanged,90 suggesting
that the North Carolina rule should not be construed in light of
Daubert. This amendment, however, should not affect North
Carolina's policy of following federal case law. Rule 702 of the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence, governing the admissibility of testimony
by experts, was identical to its federal counterpart at the time the
United States Supreme Court set forth its interpretation of Federal
Rule 702 in Daubert.91 Furthermore, Professor Kenneth Broun, one
of the drafters of the amendment to Federal Rule 702, maintains that
the advisory committee did not intend to go beyond Daubert's
holding with the amendment and that there has been no real change
in federal law as a result of it. 2 Professor Broun further notes that
"the absence of a rule amendment [in North Carolina] should make
no more difference here than it would have in the federal courts in
the absence of the amendment."93 Because Daubert was adopted
when Rule 702 of both the Federal Rules and the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence were identical and because the amendment to
88. State v. Lamb, 84 N.C. App. 569, 580 n.3,353 S.E.2d 857,863 n.3 (1987).
89. See supra note 17 (noting subsequent federal decisions that have extended the
Daubert decision).
90. See FED. R. EVID. 702; cf N.C.R. EvID. 702(a).
91. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 158 N.C. App. 316, 328, 581 S.E.2d 816, 824-25
(2003), rev'd, 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2004).
92. See Broun, supra note 19, at 11.
93. Id. at 11-12.
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Federal Rule 702 does not materially alter its effect, North Carolina's
policy of interpreting identical rules similarly remains applicable.
Taking into account legislative design both in the language of
Rule 702 itself and the commentary to the rule, as well as precedent
in the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, policy strongly favors
construing North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702 in light of federal
case law, including Daubert. Therefore, to maintain evidentiary
policy and the guidelines that practitioners follow in their evidentiary
decisionmaking, Daubert and its progeny should articulate the proper
test for admitting expert testimony in North Carolina. Instead of
following principles guiding the construction of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence, which directed years of North Carolina case law,
the Howerton court abandoned them without providing sufficient
explanation.
In addition to straying from legislative design and evidentiary
policy, the Howerton test may burden the adversary process by
leaving matters of law for the trier of fact to determine. In other
words, by rejecting Daubert in favor of an ultra-flexible test expected
to admit significantly more testimony, the jury instead of the judge
will be charged with making determinations of reliability in each
particular case. This is not the intent of Rule 702, and it is
presumably one thing the Supreme Court sought to avoid via the
Daubert decision. In fact, the Daubert Court recognized the "limits
on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence," '94 commenting
on the "wide latitude" an expert is allowed to offer opinions,
especially on items that are not based on personal observation. 9
"[T]his relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge
... is premised on an assumption that the expert's opinion will have a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline."96 To
make this determination, the Daubert Court entrusted to the trial
courts the responsibility of "ensur[ing] that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."'
Daubert refers to this as the "gatekeeping role" of the judge.98 In
addition to sorting reliable and relevant evidence from that which is
94. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (codified at FED.
R. EVID. 702) (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
95. Id. at 592.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 589.
98. See id. at 597.
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not, the gatekeeper function also helps maintain public confidence in
the courts.99
Moreover, Rule 104(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
requires that trial courts decide preliminary questions of the
admissibility of expert testimony." The admissibility of expert
testimony is a matter of law to be determined by the trial court, not
limited by the confines of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.1 1 A
clearly defined gatekeeping function ensures that decisions are
applied similarly throughout the state."0 2 The Howerton decision, in
rejecting Daubert, removed the clarity from the gatekeeping role,
decreasing the likelihood that the standard will be applied uniformly
across the state. Although in Howerton the Supreme Court of North
Carolina expressed concern that an enlarged gatekeeper function
would lead to improperly granted summary judgment motions in
favor of the defense,"3 the fact remains that initial admissibility
decisions are a matter for the judge, not for the jury. 4 Thus, the
court cannot unduly place its decision into the hands of an
unqualified jury for the sake of avoiding abuse of the standard.
The Howerton court also voiced concern that the gatekeeper role
in Daubert forces trial judges into "passing judgment on the
substantive merits of the scientific or technical theories undergirding
an expert's opinion."'' s On the contrary, all that Daubert required is
a "preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
99. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. at 8,
Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2004) (No. 383PA03).
100. See N.C. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court . .
101. See id.
102. Daubert provides a clear definition of what the gatekeeper function should look
like. The Court held that the trial judge has to determine whether the expert will testify to
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in determining issues of consequence.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. "This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Id. at 592-93.
The Court goes on to discuss various factors that can help in the reliability determination.
Id. at 593-94.
103. See Howerton, 358 N.C. at 467-68, 597 S.E.2d at 691-92. An in-depth discussion
of Daubert hearings and their repercussions is beyond the scope of this Recent
Development. For more information, see generally JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift":
Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV.
717, 772 (2004) (discussing Daubert hearings as designed to attack the admissibility of
expert evidence before trial and have it excluded on the grounds that it lacks relevance or
reliability).
104. See N.C. R. EVID. 104.
105. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 464, 597 S.E.2d at 690.
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underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue.1 0 6  This is intended to be a flexible standard that focuses
"solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
they generate.' ' 1 7 Thus, the court's characterization of the Daubert
standard as looking to the merits of scientific testimony is
misdirected. Instead, Daubert required the trial court judge to remain
confined to her proper role of making preliminary admissibility
determinations. Howerton blurs this distinction by paring down the
judge's role and pushing the reliability determination to the jury.
By failing to preserve the role of the judge in making
admissibility decisions based upon clearly articulated standards of
reliability and relevance, Howerton risks burdening juries with this
difficult task. Jurors do not have the requisite legal knowledge to sort
reliable and relevant evidence from that which is not."8 This is
especially true with the complex, technical information that expert
testimony entails. At least one state court has found that juries more
willingly accept expert opinions as the truth solely because of their
designation as experts. 09 Proponents of tightening restraints on the
admissibility of expert testimony suggest that overvaluation of
scientific evidence is a very real juror tendency. 10 Furthermore,
although the opposing party's expert can point out scientific defects in
an expert's opinion, cross-examination remains the only way for the
other side to emphasize the retaining attorney's influence as a reason
for those shortcomings.' The bottom line is that testimony should
come before a jury, whose function is to weigh that evidence, only
when the testimony has been determined-via a clear standard-to
be reliable and relevant.
A legitimate concern is that even judges may not possess the
scientific knowledge necessary to adequately perform the gatekeeper
106. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
107. Id. at 594-95.
108. See John W. Osbourne, Note, Judicial/Technical Assessment of Novel Scientific
Evidence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 530 (1990) (noting that "one finds it hard to imagine
that lay jurors are somehow transformed from people who view science as a 'black box'
into people who understand what is in the box simply because they were called to serve on
a jury").
109. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549,553 (Tex. 1995).
110. Osbourne, supra note 108, at 530; see also Stephen D. Easton, Ammunition for the
Shoot-Out with the Hired Gun's Hired Gun: A Proposal for Full Expert Witness
Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 465,480 (2000) (noting that "when the judge announces that a
witness is an 'expert,' she is telling the jurors that the witness, and the testimony she will
present, are more important than the testimony of 'ordinary' fact witnesses").
111. Easton, supra note 110, at 506.
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function;" 2 however, judges are certainly more qualified to address
the legal standards involved than are juries. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit commented that:
Although making determinations of reliability may present a
court with the difficult task of ruling on matters that are outside
of its field of expertise, this is "less objectionable than dumping
a barrage of scientific evidence on a jury, who would likely be
less equipped than the judge to make reliability and relevance
determinations."11 3
It seems only reasonable that giving the decision to judges, who are
better equipped to understand the legal method for distinguishing the
reliable and relevant from the unreliable and irrelevant, will lead to a
more efficient and accurate resolution of disputes.
The Howerton court also expressed the concern that "sweeping"
use of the judge's gatekeeping function could "unnecessarily encroach
upon the constitutionally-mandated function of the jury to decide
issues of fact and to assess the weight of the evidence."'' 4 Although
this concern is valid, the Daubert test is aimed at the admissibility of
evidence rather than its weight."' In other words, judges are to
determine the reliability and relevance of the evidence rather than its
credibility."6 By holding that judges should merely make preliminary
admissibility rulings, Daubert did not intend for judges to usurp the
jury function. Furthermore, Daubert was designed to be flexible, with
its focus on methods rather than conclusions. The Daubert Court
even suggested ways in which advocates opposing the admission of
112. See Dobbin et al., supra note 16, at 244-47. This Recent Development does not
fully explore the issue of the difficulty judges face in determining the reliability of
scientific or technical testimony. The issue has been examined in numerous articles. See,
e.g., Lind, supra note 103, at 773-74 (noting that judges have "little or no technical
training" and are thus no more capable than juries of separating real science from "junk
science"); George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical
Implications of a Judge's Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific
Evidence During the Decision-Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 291, 292 (1998)
(suggesting that scientific and technological issues arising in litigation are becoming more
complex, and judges are having to do outside research on which to base their decisions).
113. Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999)).
114. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 468, 597 S.E.2d 674, 692 (2004).
115. See generally Shelley Storer, Note, The Weight Versus Admissibility Dilemma:
Daubert's Applicability to a Method or Procedure in a Particular Case, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 231 (1998) (discussing weight versus admissibility and whether the analysis of a
particular application of a technique goes to the weight of the evidence or its admissibility
under Daubert).
116. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993) (codified
at FED. R. EVID. 702) (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
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more expert testimony could assist the jury in determining the
credibility of expert testimony.117 This implies that the test was
intended not to keep out potentially reliable testimony, but rather, to
ensure that only reliable expert evidence is admitted. The problem
with Howerton is that by removing the framework established in
Daubert and purporting to be more flexible, it risks letting in evidence
that is unreliable or irrelevant in a particular case, thereby depriving
judges and burdening juries with critical admissibility decisions.
Although Daubert, too, is subject to criticism, it maintains a more
distinct separation between matters of law and fact than does
Howerton, thus maintaining the delicate balance between the
functions of the judge and jury by allocating to them their proper
roles.
Daubert also has additional advantages over Howerton, notably
in the area of judicial efficiency. The Daubert Court conceded that
even with a flexible gatekeeping role, the jury will occasionally be
deprived of hearing about a valid discovery or insight; however, the
United States Supreme Court further explained that the benefits of
such an approach outweigh the costs because "there are important
differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the
quest for truth in the laboratory. 11 8 While scientific conclusions
evolve over time, the judicial system has to "resolve disputes finally
and quickly." '119 Although the Howerton approach may remedy the
Daubert Court's concession by diminishing the slight possibility that
valid evidence will be barred before it reaches the jury, the judicial
system is designed for efficiently resolving legal issues, which means
that some evidentiary sacrifices may have to be made to achieve that
end. "That ... is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence
designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but
for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.""12  In fact, the
stated purpose of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides that
"[t]hese rules shall be construed to secure ... elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, ' 121 demonstrating that judicial
efficiency is an important policy consideration in making evidentiary
rulings. Further, "[i]f the dominant consideration is administrative or
117. See id. at 596 (noting that "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence").
118. Id. at 596-97.
119. Id. at 597.
120. Id.
121. N.C. R. EVID. 102.
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transaction costs, Daubert clearly wins. Daubert's gatekeeping saves
considerable judicial resources." '122
While the primary concern is by no means always judicial
efficiency, one would hope that any approach to the admissibility of
expert testimony would preserve a modest amount thereof.
Nevertheless, the Howerton approach threatens to remove any sense
of efficiency the evidentiary system was designed to achieve by
requiring an ultra-flexible gatekeeping function. The Howerton court
seems to indicate that one of the main reasons for its decision is to
save "human resources required to delve into complex scientific and
technical issues,, 12' but the court simultaneously turns a deaf ear to
the additional judicial resources that will be expended under the more
permissive standard articulated.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision in
Howerton deviates from important policy considerations by straying
from the purposes behind the North Carolina Rules of Evidence,
giving much of the reliability determination to the jury instead of the
judge, and working against the goal of judicial efficiency. Failure to
acknowledge these significant policy concerns further supports the
contention that the court's decision in Howerton is inherently
deficient.
The Howerton court purportedly rejected the Daubert standard
despite departing from both precedent and policy concerns; however,
the main flaw in Howerton is that it fails to replace the Daubert
standard with a real test for North Carolina courts to use in making
the admissibility determination. As discussed, North Carolina case
law pertaining to North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702 developed
with a reliability test as the key determinant of when to admit expert
testimony.1 24 Cases such as Bullard and Pennington elaborated on
that standard and began setting forth factors to help courts with the
determination. 25 More recent cases cited Daubert in their analyses,
adopting the "gatekeeping" function articulated by the Supreme
Court.1 26 Over time, North Carolina courts had built a clear and
workable test based not only upon the federal test set forth in
Daubert, but also on the state's own unique precedent.
122. McClellan, supra note 15, at 270.
123. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 465, 597 S.E.2d 674, 690 (2004)
(emphasis added).
124. See supra notes 54-84 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 64--84 and accompanying text.
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The law had progressed as such until cut short abruptly by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision to reject the clear-
though admittedly imperfect-Daubert test. Although the Howerton
court dismissed Daubert as too "mechanistic and rigorous,' 127 it
nevertheless held that reliability is the paramount consideration in
the decision whether to admit expert testimony.128 Daubert presented
a virtually identical principle in requiring a preliminary assessment of
the reliability of methodology. The Howerton court even admitted
that North Carolina cases "share obvious similarities with the
principles underlying Daubert.' 129 Although the indices of reliability
that developed in North Carolina were not identical to the Daubert
factors, this did not by any means mandate rejection of the entire
standard prescribed in the case.130 It appears that the Supreme Court
of North Carolina disagrees more with how Daubert is applied rather
than the crux of the holding itself-that admitting expert testimony
requires a preliminary determination of reliability. The Howerton
court's decision to reject the entire Daubert standard instead of
applying it more flexibly leaves North Carolina courts with no clear
framework for making admissibility determinations for expert
witnesses.
As mentioned, the standard proffered by the Howerton court
purports to examine reliability in terms of the area of the testimony
rather than the reliability of the particular methods used."
Furthermore, the new test no longer connects the applicability of the
methods used to the particular facts of the case but instead uses a
more general definition of relevance.132 Both of these differences
detract significantly from the workable reliability of the methodology
127. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 464, 597 S.E.2d at 690.
128. See id. at 459, 597 S.E.2d at 686-87.
129. Id. at 464, 597 S.E.2d at 690.
130. In fact, the Court in Daubert intended for the test to be a flexible one, seemingly
to allow various jurisdictions to apply it somewhat differently. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (codified at FED. R. EVID. 702) (amended
Dec. 1, 2000). The Court also clearly stated that "we do not presume to set out a
definitive checklist or test." Id. at 593. Other jurisdictions have developed variations on
the reliability approach presented in Daubert, each with its own slightly unique list of
factors. Id. at 594 n.12 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir.
1985)). This Recent Development does not explore the current consensus among courts in
other states regarding acceptance, rejection, or modification of Daubert.
131. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 460, 597 S.E.2d at 687-88; see supra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text.
132. See Howerton, 358 N.C. at 462, 597 S.E.2d at 668; supra notes 46-48 and
accompanying text.
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developed under Daubert and North Carolina law, which took a
deeper, more fact-specific approach to admissibility decisions.133
Because the new test described in Howerton removes the clarity
that the Daubert framework provided and gives little guidance on
how to determine reliability other than a few shallow indices of
reliability, the Howerton decision is a step backward in the
development of North Carolina evidence law. The court provides
only that "reliability is ... a preliminary, foundational inquiry into the
basic methodological adequacy of an area of expert testimony. 134
How this differs from Daubert's holding is unclear, and the only
guidance the court gives is to say that the analysis does not "require
the expert's testimony to be proven conclusively reliable or
indisputably valid ... .,,135 This nebulous declaration provides little
certainty for North Carolina under Howerton in the absence of
assistance from the federal body of law previously available. Now,
North Carolina courts are left with only the reliability buzzword that
suggests a foundational inquiry into methodology that really has little
to do with methodology and precludes the use of familiar factors to
help determine reliability.
A superficial reliability "test" that lacks clarity, coupled with an
abrupt end to the precedent and policy that began before Daubert
and grew stronger after the decision, leaves the admissibility of expert
testimony in North Carolina in a state of uncertainty. It is unclear
what types of testimony will be admitted under the new standard and
what, if anything, will be excluded. Because it only allows a minimal
examination of reliability, the new test creates a risk that trial courts
will presume expert evidence to be admissible rather than perform
their appropriate gatekeeping function. As a result of the permissive
nature of the Howerton "test," juries will be burdened with testimony,
the methods of which they are not fully equipped to analyze and the
veracity of which they are likely to readily accept. In addition, the
court system itself will be burdened with lengthier proceedings and a
considerable loss of judicial efficiency. If promoting additional
flexibility was a goal, the Howerton court should have emphasized
this, while still leaving Daubert as a resource and a guide to the lower
courts. This would have allowed the body of North Carolina evidence
law under Rule 702 to continually develop as it had been even before
Daubert. To combat the potentially detrimental effects of the
133. See supra notes 5-19, 54-84 and accompanying text.
134. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 460, 597 S.E.2d at 687.
135. Id.
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decision, it will be up to practitioners to aggressively pursue their
cases on the merits by attacking qualifications of proposed experts,
via extensive cross-examination, and through the presentation of
reliable contrary evidence. 136 Finally, it will be left to the state courts
to determine the future of the law under Rule 702 and to redevelop
clear standards through precedent in order to clear the muddy waters
surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony in North Carolina.
ELIZABETH K. STRICKLAND
136. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (codified at
FED. R. EVID. 702) (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
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